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In June 2014 the Center for Governance and Culture in Europe (GCE) carried out an 
interdisciplinary, international conference 
on the topic “the Eastern Enlargement of 
the European Union: Effects – Challenges 
– Visions”. It focused on the experiences 
and changes which the processes of 
“Europeanization” brought about in the 
countries that joined the EU in 2004 and 2007. 
the participants also addressed misleading 
expectations as well as potential consequences 
for future enlargement rounds.1 
Since the EU enlargement in 2004, during 
which the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and 
Slovenia (along with Malta and Cyprus) joined 
the EU followed by Romania and Bulgaria in 
2007, there have been significant changes in 
Europe in general and in particular regarding 
the enlargement policy, the approval for the 
EU, and the optimism for fast integration.2 
Enlargement fatigue has spread and has 
been compounded by the severe financial 
crisis in 2008, the Ukraine conflict since 2013, 
and the 2015 refugee crisis – not to mention 
the increasing threat of terrorist attacks in 
recent years. In late June a slight majority of 
British voters opted for the Brexit, hence to 
leave the EU. In many countries of so-called 
“core Europe” populist parties have emerged, 
which pursue nationalist policies. the idea 
of a supranational community and thus 
the principle of solidarity are increasingly 
being questioned by those advocating 
national interests. Many current debates are 
characterized by notions of disintegration. 
the idea of European integration, which was a 
large-scale project to overcome the division of 
Europe, has come to an impasse.  
One important discourse regarding Europe 
was triggered by the reshaping of Europe after 
the “annus mirabilis” of 1989/1990. A radical 
system transition took place in the socialist 
countries of Eastern Europe. the Soviet 
hegemony over Eastern Europe, which was 
made possible by the Hitler-Stalin Pact and 
the Conferences of yalta and Potsdam in 1945, 
was broken by the social unrest and activities 
of the political opposition since the 1960s. At 
the same time, the Soviet system collapsed 
and was dismantled in december 1991. 
After the hesitant consent of the Allied Powers, 
the German democratic Republic joined the 
federal Republic of Germany on the basis 
of the two-Plus-four treaty on 3 November 
1990 and was integrated into the existing 
political system. the Central European 
region (i.e. the Baltic countries, Poland, the 
Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Hungary 
and Romania) experienced the transition to 
democratic forms of government as a “return 
to Europe” and heavily drew on historical 
images from the interwar period. After years 
of “colonialization” by the Soviet Union, these 
countries vehemently distanced themselves 
from the successor state Russia and aimed to 
move closer to Europe in terms of mentality 
and values. this pertained above all to the basic 
and human rights, democracy and liberalism 
which they embraced. Western Europe had 
already been pursuing a course of integration 
since the 1980s by creating a currency unions 
and dismantling border controls. 
The fall of the Iron Curtain led to new fields 
of discourse. In ideological terms, the end of 
history seemed to have been reached with the 
collapse of communism. the liberal capitalist 
system had presumably been victorious and 
remained the only paradigm. However, the 
transformations aiming for a democratic 
system were by no means linear. the nations 
developed differently, and authoritarian or 
dictatorial structures remained intact (Russia, 
Belarus). Even in the countries of Central 
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Europe, western-style constitutions and 
democratic rules were not implemented in 
linear fashion. 
For many countries it was initially a matter 
of rediscovering and strengthening national 
sovereignty after decades of colonialization 
by the Soviet Empire. this appeared strange 
in Western Europe, which was increasingly 
turning over national sovereignty to the 
supranational institutions of the European 
Union. Different concepts of identity emerged 
from the dividing lines of the Cold War and 
the East-West dichotomy persisted in varying 
ways.  
As part of the integration project, the European 
Community was formerly conceived as 
an open organization for new members. 
However, the eastern enlargement initially 
proceeded slowly because the incorporation 
of structurally weak economies was associated 
with enormous fears regarding subsidy 
payments and labor migration processes from 
East to West. Old, traditional stereotypes of 
the foreign, backward and less civilized East 
thus seemed to hold and persist until the 
late 20th century. Nevertheless, the countries 
of Central Europe placed applications for 
accession, which were approved with strict 
obligations to comply with regulations laid 
down by Brussels. Despite a hesitant attitude 
towards eastern enlargement the events in the 
Balkans in the early 1990s laid bare the fatal 
consequences of nationalistic disintegration. 
the accession candidates were subject to 
strict monitoring mechanisms in order to 
implement the acquis communautaire at 
the national level. National referendums 
were held to lend legitimacy to EU 
accession. On 1 May 2004, Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland, the Czech Republic, 
Slovakia, Slovenia and Hungary joined the 
EU. Bulgaria and Romania joined in 2007. 
Eastern enlargement brought about a new 
discourse centered on differences and 
diversity. Buzzwords such as “core Europe” 
or “two-speed Europe” characterized such 
discussions, even though the terms had 
already been used in the 1990s.  General 
questions were raised regarding how resilient 
the EU was, whether it would be expanded at 
will and what the impact on its governability, 
agricultural policy and structural funds would 
be. furthermore, people questioned where the 
boundaries of Europe lie and whether turkey, 
which had placed accession applications a 
long time ago, belongs to Europe. Should one 
pursue the deepening of integration or the 
widening of the EU? And what should the 
Bilboard on European Commission‘s Berlaymont 
Headquarters, welcoming Bulgaria and Romania into the 
EU, January 2007. Author: Zinneke, wikimedia commons.
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relationship between the center and periphery 
look like?  
This issue of Euxeinos deals with different 
notions of and experiences with Europe as 
a political, economic and cultural idea in 
the Black Sea region and in Poland. What 
characterizes the current discourse on Europe 
in the respective countries and regions, what 
debates are being carried out, what are points 
of conflict, for example the issue of relations 
with Russia? 
The authors are experts on European affairs 
and participated in the conference in June 
2014. They have written new articles for this 
issue of Euxeinos, because Europe is facing 
numerous new political challenges. the 
crisis in Ukraine in winter 2013-2014 and in 
particular the annexation of Crimea by the 
Russian federation in March 2014 have raised 
questions about relations with Russia and 
policies towards countries of the former Soviet 
Union. these questions are addressed in the 
article by dirk Lehmkuhl and Maria Shagina, 
who also discuss the sanctions imposed on 
Russia.  
In his article dealing with the EU-enthusiasm 
and simultaneous EURO-skepticism of the 
Poles, Rafał Riedel shows that there must be 
a general clarification of the visions of Europe. 
Is the EU a political community, an economic 
community, or does Europe primarily define 
itself by cultural values? 
Roumen Avramov illustrates Bulgaria’s path 
to the EU and reflects on the ambivalences of 
the EU’s enlargement policy from a primarily 
economic perspective. 
Ulrich Schmid explores countries which 
consider themselves as belonging to 
Europe, but are not members of the EU. 
He demonstrates the multiple levels of 
understandings of Europe, which have 
historical roots in Georgia, Moldavia and 
Ukraine as well as other countries. 
In reaction to current events, opinions on the 
significance of the Brexit vote have also been 
added. 
To conclude, I wish to offer a quote from Tony 
Judt from 1992, which can be transferred to 
the current debate on Europe and has not lost 
any of its contemporary relevance at all: 
“the new Europe is thus being built upon 
historical sands at least as shifty in nature 
as those on which the postwar edifice was 
mounted. to the extent that collective identities 
– whether ethnic, national, or continental – 
are always complex compositions of myth, 
memory, and political convenience, this need 
not surprise us. from Spain to Lithuania 
the transition from past to present is being 
recalibrated in the name of a “European” idea 
that is itself a historical and illusory product, 
with different meanings in different places. 
(…)
But what will not necessarily follow is 
anything remotely resembling continental 
political homogeneity and supranational 
stability – note the pertinent counterexample 
of the last years of the Habsburg Monarchy, 
where economic modernization, a common 
market, and the free movement of peoples 
was accompanied by a steady increase in 
mutual suspicion and regional and ethnic 
particularism.”3
Endnotes
1  for a conference report by Christoph 
Laug see http://www.hsozkult.de/
conferencereport/id/tagungsberichte-5588 [17 
August 2016]
2  See the thematic dossier on the EU’s 
neighborhood policy in Neue Gesellschaft/ 
frankfurter Hefte 4(2016).
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3  Judt, tony: the Past is another Country: 
Myth and Memory in Postwar Europe. In: the 
Politics of retribution in Europe. World War 
II and its Aftermath. Ed. By Istvan deak, Jan 
t. Gross, tony Judt. Princeton 2000, 293-323, 
here 317. The text was first published in 1992. 
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Opinions: The EU Eastern Enlargement from Today’s Perspective
dirk Lehmkuhl, Ulrich Schmid, University of St. Gallen
Current crises reveal Problemzonen in the 
EU after enlargement
Dirk Lehmkuhl, University of St. Gallen
If there were neither the dramatic humanitarian disaster that comes with the 
current refugee crisis nor the embarrassing 
loss of political culture characterizing the 
debate leading to the Brexit decision by the 
British people, we might be grateful for the 
sobering effect of both crises. Both crises 
unambiguously revealed Problemzonen of 
the integration project in general and of the 
EU’s 2004/7 enlargement in particular. three 
areas are particularly apparent: the unfinished 
building of sovereign nation-states in Central 
and Eastern Europe, the revealed lack of 
a shared consensus about the normative 
underpinnings of the integration project 
between the eastern and the western member 
states and, finally, the horizontal unease in the 
relationships between the member states.
there are some reasons to argue that after 
more than a decade the no longer so new 
member states in Central and Eastern Europe 
may be suffering from what can be described 
as a collective hang-over. After at least partially 
enthusiastically rallying around the European 
flag, they have had their own experiences 
with what the once promised EU land implies. 
Becoming a member of the club of stable and 
relatively prosperous Western European states 
had a price tag that went well beyond the costs 
of adapting to the standards of the common 
market. While bearing the costs and collaterals 
of the modernization of the domestic 
industries is one thing, acknowledging the 
costs of the transfer of sovereignty is another. 
In this respect the pooling of sovereignty that 
has reached a historically unpreceded level 
in the EU is frequently perceived in the CEE 
countries as déjà-vu. For some, the difference 
between the forced octroy of the former 
Soviet Union and the voluntary membership 
in the EU is blurred as both are perceived to 
generate the same effect of being governed 
by foreign powers. Accordingly, there is a 
perception within large parts of the societies 
that the period of sovereign rule and national 
self-determination between independence 
from Soviet dominance and membership 
in the EU had been too short. In particular, 
there has not been enough time for the 
consolidation of a national self-esteem that 
would be robust enough to accommodate the 
desire to live according to traditional patterns 
and the supranational governance regime of 
the European polity.
this takes me to my second point. Buying 
into European integration is more than just 
learning to be part of multilevel policy-making; 
it is more than making the domestic economy 
competitive for the single European market; 
and, finally, it is more than managing to adapt 
in administrative terms to the new complexity 
of regulations. Indeed, the European project 
is much more than just a large market for 500 
Million people that requires the harmonization 
of norms of products and production. Rather, 
the cooperation amongst the states and 
societies has gone far beyond an instrumental 
understanding of being a Zweckverband, i.e. 
a partnership of convenience. According to 
the terminology of the German sociologist 
ferdinand tönnies, the EU is no longer 
only a Gesellschaft based on the principles of 
individualism and instrumentalism. Rather, 
many of its policies build on the assumption 
of the EU as being a Wertegemeinschaft, i.e. 
a community of values. However, the self-
proclaimed attribute of being built on a 
8Euxeinos 21 / 2016
dirk Lehmkuhl 
solid stock of shared values and respect for 
a humanitarian principles has been shattered 
over the past years. Notwithstanding 
Chancellor Merkel’s motivation to unilaterally 
open up the borders to Germany for very, very 
many refugees, neither barbed wire fences 
around many countries in Central and Eastern 
Europe nor the refusal of many CEE countries 
to accept non-Christian refugees in their 
country resonates with the EU’s claim of being 
built on shared humanitarian foundations. 
finally, it would not do justice to the countries 
and societies in Central and Eastern Europe 
if we look for the reasons for the precarious 
situation of the EU only in their backyard. 
Rather, the humiliating character of the 
campaign and the outcome of the Brexit vote 
made it very obvious that there is something 
flawed in the horizontal relationship between 
the member states in general and between the 
old western and new eastern member states 
in  particular. While the fear of the “Polish 
plumber” and criminal gangs from Eastern 
European figured prominently right before the 
2004/7 enlargement to the East, the reference to 
the allegedly negative implications of the free 
movement of people (from the East!) became 
the killer argument of the Brexit campaign. It 
was not only a perception of an overcrowding 
of domestic labour markets  and the unease 
in the some parts of the British society with 
people from the states of Central and Eastern 
Europe which could be labelled xenophobic 
in the classical sense. Rather, in addition to 
both fears for their jobs and a nationalistic 
stance, the toxic “Brexit” cocktail entailed 
further ingredients such unease with orthodox 
religiosity specifically and a quite unspecific 
insecurity due to diffuse, culturally-related 
features including language, group coherence 
and other rather prejudice-based assumptions 
attributed to the people from the former Soviet 
bloc. In particular in areas where the share of 
citizens from Central and Eastern Europe was 
relatively low, the lack of real contacts between 
people from West and East led to a higher 
receptiveness for negative assumptions. 
One might argue that this unease with people 
from the East, which the British society to 
no small degree shares with other Western 
European societies, is an expression of two 
asynchronous processes: One is the fast 
and very advanced process of economic 
integration including free movement; and the 
other is the much slower process of societal 
adaptation to growing together in Europe. 
As the history of integration since the 1950s 
has shown, overcoming unease between 
societies requires exchanges, transactions 
and, in particular, time and the willingness to 
engage with each other at both the individual 
and collective level. None of these dimensions 
has been present on either side since 2004 and 
2007 respectively. 
to conclude, Jean Claude Juncker’s 2015 
statement that the European Union is not in 
a good shape as there is not enough Europe 
in the Union and there is not enough Union 
in the Union is even more to the point after 
the Brexit decision by the majority of the 
Brexit „Vote Leave“ in Islington, London, June 13, 2016. 
Author: david Holt, wikimedia commons.
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British people. At the heart of this assessment 
is not only a whole series of crises that have 
unsettled people across Europe regarding the 
advantages of cooperation between states and 
societies in Europe, but also the unfinished 
business of the last enlargement. Because 
cooperation and unionification are more 
than a technical-administrative affair, they 
require an intensified engagement of citizens, 
economic and political decision-makers at all 
levels and across the societies of Eastern and 
Western Europe. 
Russia’s view on the Brexit
Ulrich Schmid, University of St. Gallen
Officially, the Kremlin maintains that it does not hold an opinion about the Brexit. 
However, it is clear that Russia’s position 
towards the EU will be strengthened in the 
future. With Britain, the EU loses one of the 
staunchest defenders of the sanctions against 
Russia. Moreover, the Brexit is seen in Russia 
as a signal of a dwindling EU. Moscow has 
always sought bilateral talks with EU member 
states, rather than with EU headquarters in 
Brussels. 
yet the Kremlin also understands the global 
economic risks that are tied to the Brexit. 
Currently, Russia is undergoing its most 
severe economic crisis since 2008 and is 
anxiously observing the international markets. 
for Russia, less uncertainty would be more 
desirable.
Poland’s view on the Brexit
the eurosceptic conservative government 
in Warsaw has quite an ambivalent stance 
towards Brexit. On the one hand, it shares 
the nationalist values of the Ukip party. On 
the other hand, it is quite worried about the 
situation of the considerable number of Polish 
migrants in Great Britain. Even the Kaczyński 
party knows how important EU membership 
is for Poland and will not question Poland’s 
position within the EU. 
Hungary’s view on the Brexit
the Brexit is not solely a reason for Orbán to 
rejoice either. Without the United Kingdom, 
the influence of Germany on EU policies will 
be strengthened. for Orbán, it is also clear that 
the current degree of European integration will 
not be weakened after the Brexit. Orbán, just 
like Kaczyński, sees the EU as a transnational 
means towards a national end: It shall ensure 
economic prosperity but the sovereignty of 
the member states shall be safeguarded as 
much as possible.
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The Sanction Policy of the Enlarged European Union. 
The Case of Russia 
dirk Lehmkuhl, Maria Shagina, University of St. Gallen 
Introduction
Huge expectations were linked to the fall of the iron curtain. Amongst them 
was the hope to overcome the long-lasting 
East-West confrontation seemed more 
realistic and modest than, for example the 
famous hailing of the end of history. the 
10+2 enlargement of the European Union 
(EU) in 2004 and 2007 respectively nourished 
the expectation that both the political and 
economic conditionality of the EU alongside 
the dynamics of socialisation would work to 
overcome the hostile legacy of the East-West 
divide in Europe. At the same time, the EU 
engaged in interacting more closely with the 
countries at its new borders. the expectation 
was that the conflict- mitigating experience of 
the EU’s enlargement could be replicated by 
an engagement of the new eastern neighbours 
even without signals of their membership in 
the EU being imminent.
As it turned out, however, the EU’s intensified 
engagement with its new neighbours 
significantly undermined the hope for a 
solution to the conflict between the East and 
the West. the more the EU’s interacted with 
countries at its new borders that had formerly 
been incorporated into the Soviet Union, the 
more hostile the Russian stance towards the 
West became. Amongst other developments, 
which cannot be addressed here, the EU’s 
direct engagement with countries at the 
frontier with Russia was one factor in reheating 
the confrontational politics between the East 
and the West that culminated in the Russian 
invasion of Crimea and the military conflicts 
in eastern Ukraine. 
In the present article, we want to address this 
new conflictive situation by paying special 
attention to the internal dynamics within the 
enlarged EU. In particular, we focus on the 
dynamics within the EU with respect to its 
sanction policies against Russia. Our analysis 
ties into the increasing attention in the 
academic literature to sanctions in general and 
in the EU as issuer of sanctions in particular. 
However, we do not follow the broader 
interest in the effectiveness of sanctions, but 
rather elaborate on the dynamics amongst the 
member states of the enlarged EU. 
In order to study the overarching question of 
the characteristics of enlarged EU’s sanction 
policy towards Russia, we first briefly outline 
the major sequence of events and the way in 
which the EU reacted to the Russian actions 
by rendering sanctions. We then move to 
our main interest and address in particular 
patterns in the dynamics of the enlarged EU’s 
sanction policy. In particular, we address the 
question of how differences in member states’ 
interests contribute to specific cleavages and 
coalitions between pushing or hesitating 
attitudes, the question of leadership and the 
relationship between value and interest-based 
behaviour. 
A rubber stamp formality? The 
implementation and prolongation of the 
sanction regime
On 15 March 2014, in the aftermath of the 
Euromaidan events and the failed Association 
Agreement between Ukraine and the EU, 
secessionist forces initiated a referendum on 
the dissolution of the Crimea from Ukraine. 
Overshadowed by international protests with 
respect to its legality and by the boycott by 
many Crimean people, including the Crimean 
tatars, a majority voted in favour of supporting 
Crimea’s unification with Russia. While the 
Russian government laid claim to Crimea as 
a part of the Russian territory, the USA and 
EU officials called the referendum as illegal, 
illegitimate and not credible. According to 
international law standards, Crimea was 
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de facto annexed by Russia. However, the 
UN Security Council failed to adopt a draft 
resolution on the non-recognition of the 
Crimean referendum because it was vetoed by 
Russia. As a result of failed diplomatic efforts 
and stalemate in the UN Security Council, 
Crimea remains a “frozen conflict”.  
As a consequence, the Ukraine crisis 
has triggered the launch of international 
diplomatic sanctions against Russian and 
Ukrainian politicians and officials. In the 
wake of the Crimea’s annexation, the US 
introduced travel bans and asset freezes for 
those responsible for the crisis. the US banned 
the entry of seven top Russian government 
officials and four pro-Russian separatists. The 
US list included high profile officials such 
as dmitry Rogozin, a Russian deputy prime 
minister, Valentina Matviyenko, the head of 
the upper house of the Russian parliament 
and Viktor yanukovych, the former Ukrainian 
president.
Step one
Pulled by the US and pushed by some EU 
member states, EU sanctions followed. 
However, the different stances of its member 
states made it difficult to find a consensus. 
As a compromise, the EU set out a three-step 
process, with sanctions pressure steadily 
increasing if Russia did not respond and 
aggravate the situation. It began with a 
series of rather symbolic actions banning 
Russia’s application for the membership 
in the OECd and the International Energy 
Agency, excluding it from the G8 meeting 
and suspending visa liberalisation talks with 
the EU. the EU then followed the US example 
when it published its own list of 21 targeted 
individuals “responsible for actions which 
undermine or threaten the territorial integrity, 
sovereignty and independence of Ukraine”.1 
However, in this first phase, the EU list did 
not include high-profile Russian officials, 
but rather targeted self-proclaimed Crimean 
“authorities” – Sergey Aksyonov, the acting 
prime minister of Crimea, the speaker of the 
Crimean parliament, Vladimir Konstantinov, 
the acting mayor of Sevastopol and others. 
Later in May 2014, Canada and Japan joined 
the EU sanctions policy. 
In an attempt to find a diplomatic solution, 
on 16 April 2014 the parties discussed the de-
escalation process in Geneva. the main points 
of the so-called Geneva agreement is at least as 
interesting for what it included – a ceasefire in 
Eastern Ukraine, the disarmament of separatist 
groups, the return of seized buildings and the 
release of detained protesters and monitors – 
and what it did not include: it did not mention 
Crimea anymore. However, in the aftermath of 
the negotiations in Geneva neither a ceasefire 
nor any of the other conditions were properly 
implemented. 
Step two
Given the lacking success of the Geneva 
agreement and the lacking Russian stance, 
another controversial referendum on self-
rule in the regions took place on 11 May 
2014 in Eastern Ukraine, which forced the 
EU to expand the list of travel bans and asset 
freezes. It added not only another thirteen 
individuals, but also two Crimean oil and gas 
companies to its list – Chernomorneftegas 
and feodosia.2 Moreover, the EU included 
individuals close to the Russian president – 
Vyacheslav Volodin, first deputy chief of staff, 
and Vladimir Shamanov, the commander of 
the Russian airborne troops. Surprisingly, 
denis Pushilin, the self-appointed head of 
1  Council decision 2014/145/CfSP
2  Council Regulation 2014/265/CfSP
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donetsk People’s Republic was not on the 
list though. A Crimea-based gas company, 
Chernomorneftegaz, and a Crimean oil 
supplier, feodosia that were expropriated 
after the annexation, were on the sanctions 
list as well as low-profile Crimean companies 
such as the resort “Nizhnyaya Oreanda” and 
wine producer “Massandra”.3 However, due 
to the EU’s energy dependence on Russia’s 
resources,  no high-profile companies such as 
Gazprom were targeted. 
Step three
the game changer in the EU sanctions policy 
came with the crash of the Malaysian airline 
MH17. On 17 July 2014, the civilian plane was 
shot down by separatists using a Russian-
made surface-to-air missile system when it 
was flying over the conflict zone in Eastern 
Ukraine. Officially, the expansion of restrictive 
measures was linked to “Russia’s actions 
destabilizing the situation in Ukraine”4. When 
the US issued new sanctions by targeting 
Russia’s top energy firms and banks, including 
Russia’s biggest oil firm Rosneft, the second 
largest gas company Novatek as well as 
Gazprombank and VEB, a bank that financed 
Sochi Olympics, the pressure on the EU to take 
a hard line on Russia increased. 
A third stage of EU sanctions followed, which 
comprised coordinated sanctions on whole 
economic sectors – in particular finance and 
energy. In line with the US, the EU introduced 
an arms embargo with certain companies, 
banned the export of technologies for oil 
exploration and production as well as shale 
gas projects. At the same time, the European 
Investment Bank and the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and development announced 
the suspension of new lending to Russia 
3  Council Regulation No 811/2014
4  Council Regulation, 2014/512/CfSP
as well. In addition, cooperation programs 
between the EU and Russia worth € 450 
million were cancelled. In december 2014, 
the EU banned any European investments in 
Crimea in real estate, oil and gas exploration 
and outlawed ship cruises calling at Crimean 
ports.5 Inspired by both the USA and the EU, 
Australia, Norway and Switzerland joined the 
EU sanctions list imposing travel bans and 
asset freezes in the same year. 
due to the escalation of violence in Eastern 
Ukraine, in particular the indiscriminate 
shelling of residential areas in Mariupol 
in January 2015, the Heads of States and 
Governments of the EU (European Council) 
agreed to extend existing restrictive measures 
until September 2015. the suspension of 
sanctions was bound to the full implementation 
of the Minsk agreements.6 furthermore, 
in february 2015 the EU Council adopted 
additional listings of separatists in eastern 
Ukraine and their supporters in Russia. As a 
result, another 19 persons and 9 entities were 
added to asset freezes and travel ban lists.7 As 
the Minsk I Agreement failed to de-escalate the 
situation, the EU Council activated additional 
listings. 
In March 2015, the EU Council extended the 
validity of sanctions over actions against 
Ukraine`s territorial integrity for another six 
months. the asset freezes and travel bans were 
imposed against 150 persons and 37 entities.8 
The EU Council decided to officially peg the 
5  Adrian Croft and Robin Emmott. “EU 
bans investment in Crimea, targets oil sector, 
cruises.” Reuters, december 18, 2014
6  Outcome of the Council Meeting, 3369th 
Council Meeting, Foreign Affairs, Brussels, 29 
January 2015  
7  Council decision (CfSP) 2015/241, 9 
february 2015
8  Council decision (CfSP) 2015/432 (OJ L 
70, 14 March 2015) 
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validity of the sanctions with the complete 
implementation of the Minsk agreements. It 
was agreed that economic sanctions would 
remain in force until the end of 2015 when 
the Minsk agreements are fully realised. With 
the lack of progress regarding the complete 
implementation of the Minsk agreements, 
on 1 July 2016 the EU Council prolonged 
the economic sanctions to 31 January 2017, 
targeting the financial, energy and defence 
sectors as well as dual-use goods.9 In addition 
to these measures, in June 2015, the EU 
Council extended the restrictions in response 
to the illegal annexation of Crimea and 
Sevastopol which are in place until 23 June 
2017. the restrictions included the prohibition 
on imports of products, investments, tourism 
services, and exports of certain goods 
and technologies.10 Moreover,  individual 
restrictive measures in terms of a visa ban and 
an asset freeze are currently imposed against 
146 people and 37 entities.11 
The Russian response
In a response to the Western sanctions, 
Russia imposed a 12-month ban on a wide 
range of food products, including meat and 
dairy, from the US, EU, Canada, Norway and 
Australia.12 As a reaction to a new round of 
sanctions, Russia also introduced embargoes 
on imports of consumer goods and second-
hand cars from Western countries.13 In June 
9  Russia: EU prolongs economic sanctions 
by six months, Press Release, Council of the 
European Union, 1 July 2016. 
10 Crimea: EU extends restrictions in 
response to illegal annexation, Press Release, 
Council of the European Union, 19 June 2015 
11  Russia: EU prolongs economic sanctions 
by six months, Press Release, Council of the 
European Union, 1 July 2016.
12  “Russia hits West with food import ban 
sanctions row”, BBC News, August 7, 2014
13  Russia reacts to EU sanctions with 
2015, a product import ban was prolonged 
for another year, whereas the number of 
countries affected was also expanded to 
Albania, Montenegro, Iceland, Liechtenstein, 
and Ukraine14. In August 2015, tonnes of 
Western-produced cheese and foodstuff 
were publically destroyed as allegedly being 
illegally smuggled to Russia. In addition, 
Russian authorities started destroying dutch 
flowers under the suspicion of being infected 
by harmful insects. the critics say, however, 
that it is a way of taking revenge on the 
Netherlands’ call for the establishment of an 
international tribunal for the investigation of 
the MH17 crash.15 Another form of Russian 
retaliation for the Western sanctions was 
the blacklisting of 89 European politicians 
from entering the country. In contrast to the 
Western sanctions, the Russian blacklist was 
not made public. 
Sanctions upshot
two aspects follow from the description of the 
sanction episode that followed the Russian 
aggression in Crimea and its involvement 
in the conflict in eastern Ukraine. To start 
with, the EU has moved significantly beyond 
its previous sanction policies and practices 
when faced with the increasing Russian 
assertiveness. For the first time in its history, 
it issued economic sanctions that had direct 
implications for the respective economic sector 
of some of its member states. the combined 
effect of lower Russian imports of European 
goods and services due to EU sanctions and 
Russia’s counter-sanctions was estimated to 
be 0.3 percentage points off the EU’s economic 
further Western trade embargos, the Guardian, 11 
September 2014
14  http://government.ru/docs/19265/ 
15  “Russia adds countries to food import 
ban over sanctions”, BBC News, 13 August 2015 
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growth in 2014, and 0.4 per cent in 2015.16 In 
this respect, the impression of a united EU 
front against Russia was somewhat surprising.
However, although the extension of the 
restrictive measures is perceived as a legal 
formality, the demonstrated unity of 28 EU 
states in response to the Ukraine crisis could 
not have been taken for granted. On the 
contrary, behind the scenes the EU member 
states have always been divided in their 
enthusiasm and willingness to impose and 
prolong the sanctions regime towards Russia. 
the division lines among the EU member 
states are both the old ones, opening up the 
wounds of European integration (e.g. between 
the British and the french), and the new ones, 
created by the EU enlargement process. 
Unity behind the Scenes: How 
Consolidated are the EU Member States 
in the Ukraine Crisis?
With our interest in the dynamics of the 
EU sanction policy against Russia, we go 
beyond the broader range of research that 
addresses the internal implications of the EU 
enlargement that either focus on the socio-
political and socio-economic developments 
in the new member states or on the dynamics 
of decision-making at the European level.17 
Instead we shed some light on the question of 
16  Ian Bond, Christian Odendahl, and 
Jennifer Rankin. frozen: the politics and economics 
of sanctions against sanctions against Russia. Center 
for European Reform. 2015, p. 11.
17  See e.g. Rachel A. Epstein and Wade 
Jacoby. Eastern Enlargement ten years On: 
transcending the East–West divide? Journal 
of Common Market Studies Volume 52, Issue 1, 
pages 1–16; Dirk Leuffen. The Impact of Eastern 
Enlargement on the Internal functioning of the 
European Union. Why so much Continuity?, in: 
Arcidiacono, Bruno, Milzow, Katrin, Marion, Axel 
und Bourneuf, Pierre-Étienne (eds.) Europe Twenty 
Years after the End of the Cold War - The New Europe, 
New Europes?, Brüssel: Peter Lang, 17-32.
how the most comprehensive enlargement in 
its history has impacted  the foreign policy of 
the European Union. 
Dividing lines: the cliché of old and new 
member states does not work
Ever since the former US defence Secretary 
Rumsfeld coined the bon mots of a distinction 
between old and new Europe as the fault line 
in the member states’ stance towards foreign 
policy actions, a central first question relates to 
the interest in the implications of the big bang 
enlargement in 2004/2007. In the present case, 
however, Rumsfeld’s dividing lines turned out 
to be too simplistic to capture the differences 
between the EU member states over Russia’s 
actions in Ukraine and the respective red 
lines of their positions concerning the arms 
embargo as well as financial and economic 
sanctions. Actually, the situation was more 
complex than a simple opposition between 
the new 12 member states and the older 
members of the European club. At different 
stages of the development, there were some 
countries that pushed for a tougher stance, 
while others wanted to keep the door open for 
diplomatic options to address the challenges. 
However,  some cleavages still characterized 
the constellation of member states.
North-eastern hawks and Southern doves
A first cleavage resulted from a combination 
of historic, geographic and economic factors 
which did not play out into one direction 
though. In a somewhat crude way it may be 
described as an opposition between North-
eastern hawks and Southern doves. On the 
one hand, there was a group of states that 
advocated a tougher stance towards Russia 
at the different stages of the EU discussions 
on sanctions. following the annexation of 
Crimea, the United Kingdom, Poland, Sweden, 
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denmark, the Czech Republic, Lithuania, 
Latvia and Estonia were of the opinion that 
only the introduction of tougher sanctions 
including economic and trade restrictions 
could prevent a further destabilisation in 
the region. this coalition was motivated 
by a combination of factors comprising the 
traditional tougher transatlantic stance of 
the British government as well as the historic 
experience and geographic proximity of some 
of the Eastern member states. For different 
reasons that we will address below, france 
and Germany joined this group only at a later 
stage. And so did the Netherlands after the 
shooting of the Malaysian airplane that cost 
the lives of many dutch citizens. 
On the other hand, historical and geographic 
factors did not determine the positioning of the 
member states. We also have to take economic 
factors into account when highlighting the 
motivation of the second group of states that 
took a rather dovish stance towards Russia. 
the coalition of Southern dovish countries 
that opposed tougher sanctions comprised 
Italy, Greece, Cyprus, Bulgaria, Luxembourg, 
Austria, Spain, Portugal and Malta. A 
common denominator of this group found 
clear expression in statements of politicians 
that referred to the implications of sanctions 
for the national context. for instance, the 
reference to the national interest by the leader 
of the Socialist Party of Bulgaria (“Besides 
the common position of the European 
countries we have our national interests”) was 
reiterated with the reference to the economic 
implications of sanctions by the Austrian 
foreign Minister (“we should not yearn 
for economic sanctions, as they would not 
only hit Russia but also definitely hit us”).18 
18  EurActive, 17 March 2014; EurActiv, 13 
May 2014.
Hence, economic considerations that reflected 
economic dependencies, in particular in 
terms of a reliance on energy products or 
the relevance of other economic sectors such 
as banking or tourism, at least in some cases 
trumped the perception of a threat by Russia 
due to geographic vicinity and historical 
experiences. 
Inside the new member states
the importance of economic considerations 
in relation to both the historic experience of 
the Soviet domination after the Second World 
War and the geographic proximity to an ever 
more assertive Russia mirrored the concern 
of some member states over the implications 
for the domestic economies that might follow 
both EU sanctions and potential Russian 
countermeasures. However, the economic 
aspect at best partially explains the divide 
within the new member states in their reaction 
to the invasion of Crimea and the involvement 
in the destabilisation of Eastern Ukraine. the 
picture is indeed more complex.
the hawkish stance of the Baltic countries 
may be explained by a significantly stronger 
perception of a threat by Russia. On the one 
hand, the presence of Russian military planes 
and ships in the Baltic Sea and airspace that 
had increased over the past years. On the other 
hand, the existence of a significant Russian 
minority in the countries nourished the fear of 
a Ukraine scenario in their countries. Hence, 
in the Baltic countries as well as in Poland, 
the historical experience contributed to the 
dominance of an anti-Russian attitude in both 
the respective societies and discourses of 
political elites. 
While the Romanian situation was somewhat 
similar, the picture in Bulgaria was again 
a different one. The aforementioned 
quotation of the leader of the socialist party 
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indicated the awareness of the country’s 
economic vulnerability given its economic 
interdependence with Russia. Both the 
country’s dependence on the supply of energy 
from Russia and the importance of the Russians 
in some parts of the country contributed to a 
softer stance of the Bulgarian decision-makers. 
Yet a different aspect might help to understand 
the attitude of Hungary and Greece. In both 
countries the governments in charge with 
Prime Ministers Orbán and tsipras at the top 
perceived Russia not primarily as a threat, but 
rather displayed some sympathy for different 
reasons. despite his self-declared liberal and 
anti-communist background, Orbán openly 
and explicitly expressed the view that Russia 
under Putin came close to his vision of an 
illiberal democracy and serves as a kind of role 
model for his idea of transforming the political 
system of Hungary. On the other hand, tsipras 
and his left-wing political party Syriza had had 
historical bonds with the communist party in 
the Soviet Union. Along with the ideological 
proximity, Greece’s explicit rapprochement to 
Russia was motivated by economic factors. Its 
involvement in the Russian-turkish pipeline 
project South Stream had top priority, 
while it also hoped to find a financially 
supportive ally at a time when the European 
Monetary Union and the IMf were exerting 
massive pressure on the Greek government 
to enact significant domestic reforms. 
to sum up, it becomes apparent that there 
is a huge level of divergence between the 
new member states, which no single factor 
alone can explain. Instead the combination 
of different factors merged into country-
specific motivations and attitudes on the EU’s 
sanctions regime towards Russia.
Dynamics at the Top Table
Interestingly, with the exception of Poland 
none of the new member states came close 
to a seat at the top table of European foreign 
policy. the Polish ambitions may be seen as a 
function of the country’s size that compared 
to that of Spain and Italy  and its historical 
experience of being invaded three times in one 
century.19 
the active Polish stance included the 
promotion of a more substantial engagement 
of the EU with its neighbours to the East. It 
found Sweden as a strong allied partner to 
push the Eastern dimension in the European 
Neighbourhood Policy in 2004. during the 
crisis in Ukraine, the so-called Weimar triangle 
was revived. Established in 1991 as a means 
to politically connect the traditionally strong 
franco-German axis with the most important 
economy of Central and Eastern Europe, the 
foreign ministers of the Weimar triangle 
temporarily took the lead and negotiated a 
settlement with the parties involved in the 
conflict in Kiev in 2014. Later on, the dynamics 
changed, however, as the french president 
françois Hollande and the German chancellor 
Angela Merkel became the top negotiators 
with the heads of states of Ukraine and Russia, 
Petro Poroshenko and Vladimir Putin – an 
interaction that was labelled the Normandy 
format. 
Other dynamics at the top table were also 
quite illuminating. to start with, there was a 
temporary re-emergence of the antagonism 
between france and the UK. the two countries, 
which in the course of European integration 
frequently displayed opposing positions in 
the areas of defence and security policy, were 
at odds over the appropriate tasks regarding 
19  for the Polish foreign policy objectives 
see e.g. the official document Polish Foreign 
Priorities 2012-2016, Warsaw, March 2012, http://
www.msz.gov.pl/resource/d31571cf-d24f-4479-
af09-c9a46cc85cf6:JCR [retrieved 18. 11.2015].
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the arms embargo and financial sanctions. 
On the one hand, the UK pushed for an arms 
embargo, while france refused to support 
these sanctions because it had a € 1.5 billion 
contract for the delivery of two helicopter-
carriers to Russia. On the other hand, france 
initiated financial sanctions against Russia 
which found less support in the UK as these 
would hit the City of London heavily. In an 
attempt to find an “equitably shared” solution 
to the EU sanctions policy, the pressure on 
Russia was significantly diminished in the 
first two phases. The French position changed 
towards a tougher stance only after the 
shooting down of the Malaysian airplane – 
and after some clarification on the costs of a 
rescission of the sale of the helicopter carrier.
Last but not least, position of Germany needs 
to be addressed. two dimensions are relevant: 
the shifting motivations for the German 
position and the more general characterization 
of its role in the enlarged Europe. With respect 
to the first dimension, its deep involvement 
in Central and Eastern European economies 
motivated the interest of both politicians 
and industry representatives to mitigate the 
conflict and its economic implications. As 
German exports account for about a third of 
EU exports20, the German chancellor and her 
foreign minister, frank-Walter Steinmeier, 
invested very much time and energy in 
keeping channels of communication between 
the parties open and  finding pragmatic 
solutions. Germany was a key player in the 
Minsk agreements that were meant to end 
the conflict in Ukraine. But unlike Poland, 
Germany like france took a dovish stance in 
the first phase of the negotiations after the 
annexation of Crimea by Russia. friendly 
relationships between Germany and Russia 
20  Bond, Odendahl, and Rankin 2015: 12.
established under the Schröder chancellorship 
divided the German elites in their response 
towards Russia. the SPd elite, including 
Helmut Schmidt and Sigmar Gabriel, 
favoured soft response to Russia’s aggression 
and formed so-called Putin-Versteher group 
(members of the elite who sympathise with 
Vladimir Putin’s politics). But the longer 
the conflict lasted, the more unreliable the 
Russian counterpart turned out to be and after 
the escalation with the shooting down of the 
Malaysian aircraft, the constellation ultimately 
changed, with Merkel and foreign Minister 
Steinmeier pushing both the coalition partners 
and German businesses to tougher sanctions 
against Russia. 
There have been many efforts to characterize 
the role of Germany in the enlarged 
Europe in general. Especially during the 
financial crisis, the dominant role played 
by Chancellor Merkel and finance Minister 
Schäuble earned the term ‘Europe’s reluctant 
hegemon’ as coined by the Economist. the 
Russian-Ukrainian crisis, however, saw a 
different role of German politicians. Rather 
than dominating the scene, Merkel was 
characterized as a “go-to woman” due to her 
numerous travel activities to Kiev,  Minsk, 
Paris or to the d-day memorial celebrations in 
france to meet Putin, which were linked to the 
celebration of the 70th anniversary  of the end 
of WWII.21 In a similar vein, foreign Minister 
Steinmeier characterized the brokering role 
of Germany in an article of the New york 
times as follows: “Germany will seek to play 
an efficient role as Europe’s ‘Chief facilitating 
officer’, forging an ambitious and unified 
21 h t t p : / / b l o g s . r e u t e r s . c o m / j o h n -
lloyd/2014/08/22/europe-bows-to-germany-
merkel-and-that-might-be-a-good-thing/ [retrieved 
18. 11.2015]
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response to the challenges we are facing”.22
European values vs national economic 
interests 
The forging of a unified European response 
in reaction to the Russian aggression turned 
out to be no easy task. the Russian aggression 
took the EU by surprise as it not only 
significantly undermined its idea of a security 
architecture for Europe built on mutual trust 
and confidence. Russia’s crude violation of 
international law also challenged the EU’s 
value system and self-understanding as a 
normative and civilian power that seeks to 
address problems through co-operation, non-
military means and law-based, multilateral 
engagement. Hence, most European policy-
makers acknowledged that the blatant Russian 
behaviour posed a challenge to common 
European values. 
However, there was no common position 
of the member states on how to react to 
Russia’s assertiveness. As described above, 
the motivations of the member states 
differed significantly, comprising pragmatic 
diplomatic approaches, historically motivated 
tough stances and economically driven 
considerations. Not only was the constellation 
characterized by an absence of clear cut 
cleavages between or within old and new 
member states, but also by member states 
that shifted their position from a dovish to 
a hawkish stance over time. Given these 
complexities, it was surprising that the EU 
speedily managed to put into place a coherent 
and credible system of sanctions in the first 
place. this holds for both the relative speed 
and in particular for quality of the sanctions 
that significantly went beyond the traditional 
22  http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/12/
o p i n i o n / s a v e - o u r - t r a n s - a t l a n t i c - o r d e r .
html?smid=pl-share&_r=0 [retrieved 18. 11.2015]
means related to arms and visa related 
measures. 
It may be argued that the Russia’s aggressive 
behaviour has been a game changer in the 
EU’s sanction history. the current sanction 
regime against Russia contradicts statements 
that claim that the EU only manages to 
sanction weaker countries that lack the means 
to reciprocate.23 Apparently, the declaration 
of a three step escalation in the sanctions 
towards Russian and Ukrainian elites, which 
was originally a compromise between the 
hawkish and the dovish coalitions amongst 
the member states, gained an independent 
momentum after the shooting down of the 
Malaysian airline. the member states became 
rhetorically entrapped as stepping back from 
prior agreed action would have undermined 
the credibility of their policies with respect 
to both external and domestic audiences. As 
a consequence, the decision to enact tough 
economic sanctions against Russia was more 
due to an unintended momentum of the 
situation than an expression of the normative 
actor Europe. In this situation, the shifted 
position of Germany towards hawkishness 
contributed to formal unanimity among the 
member states. Being a key member state, 
Germany’s more stringent position set up a 
pattern for other – weaker, smaller or new – 
member states and shaped the development 
of the EU sanctions policy as a whole. for 
instance, under Germany’s duress Bulgaria 
was forced to halt the construction work on 
Russia’s initiated South Stream natural gas-
pipeline. 
Conclusion
23  Karen del Biondo. EU Aid Conditionality 
in ACP Countries: Explaining Inconsistency in 
Sanctions Practice. Journal of Contemporary European 
Research. 2011, vol. 7 (3), :380-395: 382
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One may argue that the case of the sanctions 
regime towards Russia over its annexation of 
Crimea and its military involvement in the 
conflicts in the eastern part of Ukraine paints a 
positive picture of the enlarged EU’s capability 
to consent on foreign policies in its Eastern 
neighbourhood. It can also be argued that the 
share of the new member states in painting 
this picture has been significant. 
However, there are also reasons to be more 
sceptical about the situation. One reason 
for this scepticism relates to the question of 
sustainability of the strong, common position 
of the EU. While it already was difficult to 
avoid loopholes in the sanction regime during 
its first years of existence, the challenge to 
uphold a tight and coherent regime has grown 
substantially over time. In this regard, both 
the economically motivated lobbying by 
businesses in many member states and the 
geostrategic considerations as expressed for 
instance in a “Issues Paper on relations with 
Russia”24 by the EU’s High Representative 
Mogherini work into the same direction. It only 
seems a question of time that the inglorious-
pragmatic “business as usual” will replace the 
value-based sanction regime against Russia. 
An even bigger question mark concerning the 
coherence of the enlarged EU’s foreign policy 
relates to the dividing lines that have become 
so strikingly apparent during the current 
refugee crisis. the issue that inherently links 
the domestic policies of the member states 
with the internal and external policies of the 
EU revealed substantial dividing lines between 
many of the old and the new member states. 
the challenge for the EU in this context is even 
more substantial as the clash between Western 
24  Issues paper on relations with Russia. 
Foreign Affairs Council of 19 January 2015; http://
blogs.ft.com/brusselsblog/files/2015/01/Russia.pdf 
[retrieved 18. 11.2015]
and Eastern members relates to the core of the 
EU’s foundations, i.e. its norms and values as 
well as the solidarity between its members.
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The European Histories of Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia and 
their Russian Challenges
Ulrich Schmid, University of St. Gallen 
there is no such thing as a clearly defined presence of European traditions, let alone 
political structures in the rather abridged 
histories of national independence in Moldova, 
Ukraine, and Georgia. this countries, however, 
display a strong commitment to Europeanness, 
which, in turn, shapes the political culture of 
the above post soviet states. famously, Zurab 
Zhvania, at the time president of the Georgian 
parliament, stated in 1999 in Strasbourg: “I 
am Georgian and therefore I am European.”1 
Similar statements could be heard in Ukraine 
and in Moldova. 
Culture, Statehood and Independence
for Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia, Europe, 
or more precisely the European Union, 
is the main focus of their foreign policy. 
this becomes clear when we examine the 
websites of the respective foreign ministries 
– the European flag has a prominent place 
everywhere; Moldova’s foreign office even 
adopted the official designation of ‘Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and European Integration’. 
1  Natia and Maia Mestvirishvili: ‘I am 
Georgian and therefore I am European:’ Re-
searching the Europeanness of Georgia. In: Central 
European Journal of International and Security 
Studies. 8/2014, S. 52-65.  
None of the three states has a long tradition 
of independent statehood. All of them 
experienced a very short period of sovereignty 
after the collapse of the tsarist Empire in 1917. 
though Ukraine and Georgia declared their 
independence after the Bolshevik Revolution, 
they were soon incorporated into the newly 
established Soviet empire. Moldova enjoyed a 
brief period of independence in 1917 only to be 
occupied by Romania one year later. during 
the interwar period, Moldova belonged to 
Romania. transnistria, meanwhile, became 
part of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic. 
Moldova was created as a Soviet  republic after 
World War II when Stalin seized Bessarabia, 
which had been part of imperial Russia in the 
19th century. Moldova is a good example of 
the contradictory nationality politics in the 
Soviet era: On the one hand, the official Soviet 
Marxist ideology belittled the importance 
of nationality in its assumption that nations 
were products of the bourgeois era and 
would eventually disappear. On the other 
hand, national minorities were protected, and 
rewarded for their loyalty with some limited 
autonomy. the “friendship of nations” was 
one of the ideological pillars of the Soviet 
Union. In order to justify the new state of the 
Moldavian Socialist Soviet Republic, a full-
fledged Moldovan nationality was created 
on the basis of a “Moldovan language” by 
switching from the Latin to the Cyrillic script.2 
today, we can observe an essentialising 
European discourse in all three states. 
Moldovan, Ukrainian, as well as Georgian 
intellectuals and politicians highlight 
European episodes of the past in order to 
prove their European heritage. 
the idea of a European national culture itself, 
however, came to Moldova, Ukraine, and 
2  see Euxeinos No. 15/16, 2014.
flag of Georgia in the Council of Europe. 
Author: Spartaky, wikimedia commons
22Euxeinos 21 / 2016
Georgia mainly through Russian intellectual 
discourse. this reception ensued relatively late; 
only in the 1860s did ideas about national unity 
reach the periphery of the Russian empire. 
Crucial was, of course, the successful example 
of Italy with the heroic myth of Garibaldi. the 
design of the desired state was not very clear 
either. In Georgia, intellectuals fantasized 
about a state structure that would resemble 
a combination of values, including those of 
liberal Britain, and national Italy. At times, 
they also aspired to establish a socialist state.3
In 19th century Ukraine, ideas about a 
federation with Great Russia were prevalent. 
these dreams were destroyed after the 1863 
Polish uprising, which entailed a severe 
policy of oppression also directed against the 
Ukrainian nationalists. 
Under Soviet rule, after an initial policy 
of “korenizacija” (“rooting in”), national 
movements were brutally suppressed. this was 
especially the case in Ukraine and Moldova. In 
both territories, horrible famines occurred as a 
result of a reckless collectivization – in Ukraine 
in 1931/1932, in Moldova in 1946/1947. 
In Georgia, ironically enough, the claim 
for national rights took a pro-Stalinist 
stance. A post-soviet marble plate on the 
Rustaveli boulevard reads: “this monument 
commemorates the participants of a peaceful 
rally gunned down by the Soviet regime 
on March 9, 1956”. the text may, mildly 
put, lead to misunderstandings, as the 
demonstration was against successive de-
Stalinisation measures. In 1956, Georgians 
were still proud of their leader, and were 
discontent with the policy of thaw proclaimed 
3  Gia tarkhan-Mouravi: Georgia’s Eastern 
Aspirations and the Eastern Partnership. In: 
Stephen f. Jones: the Making of Modern Georgia, 
1918-2012. the first Georgian Republic and its 
successors. New york 2014, 49-73, 50.
by the new secretary general Khrushchev.
Religion
the orthodox church is dominant in all three 
countries. there has been a long discussion 
about the compatibility of Western democracy 
and the orthodox mind-set in the territories 
of the former Byzantine Empire. yet, such 
allegations mostly perpetuate both catholic 
and protestant resentments against their 
eastern rival. 
However, the important tradition of 
dual loyalty in the West should not be 
underestimated– towards the church on one 
side, and towards the state on the other. this 
double allegiance shaped Western notions 
of citizenship – loyalty to the state could 
always be limited by the individual religious 
conscience. In our three examples, such a dual 
loyalty is only present in the case of Western 
Ukraine with its Greek-catholic church. the 
Greek-catholic church recognizes Papal 
supremacy, but continues to practice orthodox 
rites. 
In all other regions of the states under 
consideration, there is no rivalling loyalty 
between the state and the church. According 
to Orthodox tradition, the head of state is 
simultaneously the head of the church. In 
this situation, religious identity markers 
corroborate rather than challenge national 
identification. Especially in Georgia, this link 
between power and religion is exploited by the 
state power: One of the achievements of the 
Saakashvili government was the construction 
of a giant cathedral in tbilisi. 
Sovietization
the Europeanization project in Moldova, 
Ukraine, and Georgia is very much a product 
of the local elite. this small layer of the 
society was able to take advantage of the 
Ulrich Schmid
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privatisation of state property in the “wild” 
90s, often enjoyed an education in the West, 
and maintains relations with members of the 
global economy. 
those left behind by the rapid (and often 
corrupted) process of modernization, 
including the rural population as well as the 
older generation, however, still long for a 
patrimonial state, which will take care of them. 
In all three countries, the year 1991 should not 
only be seen as a rupture. In many ways, Soviet 
patterns of societal organization and value 
preferences still persist and shape people’s 
ideas about the duties and responsibilities of 
a state. 
Culturally, Sovietisation came under the 
guise of Russianisation. this notion – as 
opposed to Russification – points to the strong 
influence of Russian as a language of higher 
education, administration and interethnic 
communication. 
Soviet nostalgia is also a wide spread remedy 
against the main illness of modernity: 
the uncertainty of the future. the Soviet 
system seemed to last forever; its values 
and mechanisms were familiar to everyone; 
Soviet institutions penetrated every realm 
of life. there was, however, a positive aspect 
of the totalitarian oppression: the Soviet 
Union rendered the system and everyday life 
predictable. 
this is also why the self appointed leaders of the 
Euromaidan chose not to claim responsibility 
for the toppling of the Lenin statue in Kyiv 
on dec 8, 2013. they knew exactly how much 
Lenin was still revered by the older generation 
of Ukrainians. 
Domestic Ethnic Heterogeneity
Moldova, Ukraine, and Georgia still have to 
come to terms with their minority problems. 
the topic of national independence almost 
exclusively dominated the political agenda in 
all three states during the 1990s. Unfortunately, 
the pathos of national independence 
precluded a viable policy for minorities in all 
of the newly independent states. 
Language policy is a case in point. Moldova, 
Ukraine, and Georgia have strongly advocated 
for the case for a one state language policy. 
Georgia had to contain Abkhazian and 
South Ossetian separatism from the very 
beginning of its independence; these tensions 
reached their peak in the August war of 2008. 
The Georgian constitution has little to say 
about the protection of minority rights. the 
main reason for this is the perceived separatist 
threat in the country. Georgian leaders 
were convinced after 1991 that centripetal 
rather than centrifugal tendencies should be 
strenghthened. Georgia adopted a framework 
for minority rights only recently, and within 
the legislation of the Council of Europe. 
All three states are unitary states, and rely on 
one chamber of parliament only. from the 
outset in the early 1990s, federalism was seen 
as a threat to the integrity of the state -
Moldova is split between the so-called 
Moldovanists and Romanianists. 
Moldovanists believe in a distinct Moldovan 
nation and culture, whereas Romanianists 
hold that Moldova is part of Romania. 
At the same time, Romania remains the 
most important partner for Moldova. the 
Moldovan Prime Minister recently expressed 
his hope that Moldova might access the EU in 
2019 under the Romanian presidency of the 
EU council. 
Moldova already since 1992 has to cope with 
the runaway republic of transdniestria which 
is a de facto state alimented but not officially 
recognized by Russia. 
When Saakashvili assumed office in Georgia, 
he was very much aware of the ethnic 
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heterogeneity in his country. He addressed 
the audience during his inaugural speech 
with the words: “I would like to greet Kartli, 
Kakheti, Imereti, Mengrelia, Guria, Abkhasia, 
Adjara, Mtskheta-Mtianeti, Ratcha, Samtskhe-
Javakheti, [and] Shida Kartli.”4 Saakashvili 
was, however, a strategic player. He 
instrumentalized the respect he had previously 
extended to national minorities as a political 
leverage in order to strengthen his executive 
power in the government. A notorious case 
in point was the 2011 decision to transfer the 
Georgian parliament to Kutaisi, allegedly for 
reasons of decentralisation. 
A similar tendency can be observed in 
Ukraine. As the constitution states, Ukraine 
is a unitary state. federalization has always 
remained an item on the agenda of the 
opposition in Ukraine and never made it into 
government politics. this holds true for Rukh, 
the nationalist movement in the early 1990’s, 
and for yanukovych’s Party of Regions, which 
called for federalisation until its accession to 
power in 2010. After yanukovych’s accession 
to the presidency, his claims disappeared 
into thin air. today, the decentralisation as 
outlined in the Minsk 2 agreement, is a process 
imposed by the Russian federation. 
Russias geopolitical aspirations
Since 2012, Russia has increased its geopolitical 
and imperial aspirations. the clearest 
expression of this new self-consciousness 
can be found in the foreign policy doctrine 
from february 23, 2013. this is what the 
doctrine has to say about Moldova: “Russia 
[…]will participate […] in the settlement 
of the transdniestria problem on the basis 
of respect for the sovereignty, territorial 
4  President Saakashvili’s Inauguration 
Speech. http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.
php?id=26694
integrity, and neutral status of the Republic 
of Moldova while providing a special status 
for transdniestria.”5 It is quite interesting that 
Russia stresses the notion of sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of Moldova. the reason for 
this is that Russia seeks to retain transdniestria 
as a thorn in Moldova’s side. Conversely, the 
worst-case scenario for Russia would be if 
Moldova gave up transdniestria in order to 
join NAtO and the EU. for this reason Russia 
does not accept transdniestria as a member 
of its federation even though transdniestria 
requested membership in 2006, and again 
after the Russian federation incorporated 
Crimea. the status quo in transdniestria is the 
best guarantee that Moldova will stay what it 
is, a satellite of Russia in the so called “near 
abroad”.
the foreign policy doctrine uses a cautious 
wording when it comes to Ukraine: “Russia 
will build up relations with Ukraine as a 
priority partner within the CIS, contribute 
to its participation in extended integration 
processes.” After the violent events of 2014, 
Ukraine is no longer a priority partner, at 
least from a Ukrainian perspective. though he 
continues to talk about the brotherly nation of 
Ukrainians, it is clear that Putin lost Ukraine 
as a prospective member of his prestigious 
Eurasian Economic Union project that includes 
so far Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgystan and 
Armenia. 
Russia seeks to instigate political unrest in 
Eastern Ukraine. It may therefore be fair to 
speak about a ‘transdnestrisation of Eastern 
Ukraine’: If donetsk and Luhansk are not 
controlled by the central government in 
5  Concept of the foreign Policy of the 
Russian federation. Approved by President of the 
Russian federation V. Putin on 12 february 2013 
http://archive.mid.ru//brp_4.nsf/0/76389FEC168189
Ed44257B2E0039B16d
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Kyiv, Ukraine will not be able to continue it’s 
Western integration – or at least not within its 
1991 frontiers.  
Even Georgia, Russia’s most inimical 
neighbouring state, appears in Russia’s 
foreign policy doctrine: “Russia is interested 
in the normalization of relations with 
Georgia in the areas in which the Georgian 
side shows its willingness, while taking into 
account the existing political environment in 
transcaucasia”. this is a euphemistic call to 
accept the political realities in Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia. the most probable outcome is 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia’s integration into 
the Russian federation within the coming 5-10 
years. 
Georgia itself went through a difficult process 
of disillusionment. It became clear to the 
Georgians that its Western partners – Europe 
as well as the US – have only a limited 
potential to counteract Russian aspirations in 
transcaucasia. 
Perspectives for the future
Georgia and Ukraine finally signed the trade 
agreement with the European Union on June 
27, 2014. But this is only a first step on a long 
journey. 
Moldova probably has to renounce its claims to 
transdniestria. Even in this case, EU accession 
seems to be quite ambitious for the foreseeable 
future. 
Ukraine and Moldova both have their 
advocates within the EU: Poland and Romania. 
these two new EU-member states do not act 
selflessly. Both have an imperial past, which 
neither of them seeks to revive. their post-
imperial situation, however, clearly shapes 
their range of political action.
Georgia does not have such an advocate. this 
is why Georgia may try to move closer to the 
US and to draw on their geopolitical interests.
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Abstract 
This paper addresses the intriguing situation in which there is an identified paradox inside the 
Polish society, namely strong Euro-enthusiasm combined with clear EURO-scepticism. the author 
of this article differentiates between EURO-scepticism and Euro-scepticism. Euro-scepticism is a 
recognised and extensively researched phenomenon across Europe, most generally conceptualised 
as a negative attitude towards the European integration process (in particular in the form of the 
European Union). EURO-scepticism, by contrast, is a much narrower category which can be 
characterised as a negative attitude towards the monetary integration on a supranational level, its 
deepening, participation in it, etc.  Poland serves as an example of this in this paper. In Poland, 
we can observe the interesting paradox of substantially pro-EU attitudes in society combined with 
strong anti-EURO feelings. they translate into a stable position of Poland in the outer core of the 
EU. Based on the available public opinion reports (from the national and supranational level), this 
paper aims to answer the question why there is so much EURO-scepticism in such a Euro-optimistic 
society and why it matters.
Key words: Euro-scepticism, EURO-scepticism, Poland, European monetary integration
Why so much EURO-scepticism among the Euro-enthusiasts?
Rafał Riedel, University of Opole, TU Chemnitz
the central question of the article is why and how it is possible that one of the most 
Euro-enthusiastic societies in the European 
Union, that is the Polish society, displays so 
much EURO-scepticism. the author provides 
answers to this intriguing question based on 
the recent public opinion polls on various 
aspects of Poles’ attitudes towards European 
integration as well as Poland’s place in it with 
special emphasis on the issue of participation 
in the supranational monetary policy. It is a 
key issue in post-enlargement Central and 
Eastern Europe. Most of post-communist 
Europe joined the Euro-club, if only they could 
(some of them even in a one-sided Euroisation 
mode), while Poland is the largest economy 
outside the inner core in the region and among 
the so called New Member States (NMS). 
The integration process and monetary 
union
After having joined the European Union in the 
“big bang” enlargement of 2004, the Republic 
of Poland obliged to join the final stages of 
the monetary integration. Already from the 
moment of ratifying the Accession treaty 
(2003), Poland, like many of the NMS enjoys 
a derogation from adopting the common 
currency1. the approaches of the other NMS 
remain mixed. Seven of the ten new member 
states that joined the EU on 1 May 2004 
decided for a strategy of adopting the Euro as 
soon as possible (Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, 
Malta, Cyprus, Slovenia and Slovakia). 
Consequently, these countries joined the ERM 
II (second generation of the Exchange Rate 
Mechanism) as early as possible. However 
Hungary and Poland, like the Czech Republic 
opted to participate in the ERM II only for 
the shortest period necessary to fulfill the 
exchange rate criterion and make technical 
preparations for the Euro. However, neither 
country has set such a date so far. yet this 
temporary derogation does not exempt any 
member state from the obligation to adopt 
the Euro. the Polish Republic, like any other 
1  In the meaning of Article 122 of the treaty 
establishing the European Community (EC)
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member state from outside of the Eurozone 
(except for the United Kingdom or denmark, 
which negotiated a special status in this 
regard), must work towards the introduction 
of the Euro as soon as possible. It is also linked 
with fulfilling some macroeconomic criteria 
known as the Maastricht criteria2. these 
criteria, in the case of Poland, were achieved 
in 2015, when the EU Commission stopped 
the excessive deficit procedure and the Polish 
deficit dropped below 3% of the GDP. All the 
other criteria regarding inflation, public debt 
and long-term interest rates remain at the 
stable level. yet the Polish government (in 
agreement with the Polish Central Bank, NBP 
– Narodowy Bank Polski) still does not intend 
to join the Euroclub soon. this is a political 
decision that stems from the strong anti-
Euro positions of Polish society. This specific 
Polish EURO-scepticism is quite an interesting 
phenomenon in the context of the vehemently 
pro-EU attitudes in Polish society.
Euro-scepticism and EURO-scepticism
Euro-scepticism can be generally understood 
as a negative attitude towards the European 
Union, the European integration process in 
general, some of its aspects or just the idea of 
uniting the continent in any respect (taggart, 
Szczerbiak, 2004). More specifically EURO-
scepticism is defined here as a negative 
attitude towards the Eurozone, monetary 
integration on the supranational level, some of 
its aspects or ideas and concepts related to it 
(Zuba, Riedel 2015). Inside of the Eurozone, it 
may mean disagreement on further deepening 
monetary and fiscal integration or even 
2  the new EU member states, besides being 
required to harmonize their economies in line with 
the convergence criteria defined in the Maastricht 
treaty, they are also expected to achieve a high 
degree of sustainable convergence in order to join 
the Euro area.
arguments to leave the Euroclub, whereas 
outside of the Eurozone it usually means the 
decision to remain in such a position.
Conceptualizations and categorizations 
of the terms EURO-scepticism and Euro-
scepticism are embedded in rich scholarly 
literature (see or example: Katz 2008), which 
became even more important in the context 
of the economic crisis that hit Europe in 
2008 (Serricchio, tsakatika 2013). therefore a 
deep understanding of the phenomenon, its 
determinants, mechanisms, effects and side-
effects is central in contemporary research 
on the European Union. Euroscepticism is no 
longer just an aberration from the mainstream 
politics in the EU. It has become mainstream, 
at least, after the most recent elections to 
the European Parliament (2014). As a result, 
also scientifically, it is no longer only a 
contextual variable, but has drawn attention 
as a widespread phenomenon worthy of 
explanation. 
In the case of the new member states though, 
relatively few academic analyses have been 
conducted on Euroscepticism. In the end, it is 
the old member states, like Great Britain (with 
the Eurosceptic UKIP – UK Independence 
Party) and france (front National), which 
capture the spotlight with the spectacular 
success of their Eurosceptic parties. In the 
first decade of full membership the EU 
newcomers focused on proving that they 
are “good Europeans”. Evidence from quite 
successful EU Council Rotating Presidencies, 
Presiding the EU Parliament and, last but not 
least, obtaining the President of the European 
Council seat proves that the NMS and their 
political elites feel more and more comfortable 
in the corridors of the EU institutions in 
Brussels. However, this does not mean that all 
the new societies in the EU are unconditioned 
Euro-enthusiasts. the Czechs, the Hungarians 
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and many others have shown their EU 
dissatisfaction on many different occasions. 
yet the largest NMS, Poland, has remained a 
stable Euro-optimist. Even when governed by 
a moderate Eurosceptic coalition (2005-2007), 
Polish society proved to be among the most 
Euro-enthusiastic in the Union.  
Values and “Valutas”
What are the sources of this almost undisputed 
Euro-positive attitude and why Poles belong 
to the most EURO-sceptic camp when it 
comes to potentially joining the Eurozone 
club? there is an important gap between the 
support for European integration as such 
and the supranational monetary integration 
in particular inside the Polish society. And it 
cannot be understood just as an illustration 
of a diversified public opinion typical for all 
democratic societies. In this case, the same 
people demonstrate a great deal of sympathy 
and support for the European Union and at 
the same time they are strongly EURO-sceptic. 
In developing these attitudes they refer to 
a totally different, very often conflicting, 
set of ideas, norms and values. It is hence a 
fundamental misunderstanding inside Polish 
public opinion rather than logical Euro-
optimism combined with equally rational 
EURO-scepticism. 
the graph above suggests that directly after 
the transformation, there was very strong 
support for European integration and Polish 
participation in it. this was a result of a 
strategic turn narrated in the public discourse 
as the “return to Europe”. the European Union 
impressed the Poles as an area of economic 
prosperity, political stability and a promised 
land in general. thus high expectations could 
only be disappointed and that is why when the 
EU accession negotiations started and the EU 
became much more a set of figures, transition 
periods, opt-outs, etc., the fairy-tale picture 
disappeared and the first disappointments 
could be observed in the period 1998-2002. At 
that time however the government launched 
its information/promotional campaign before 
the accession referendum. this stimulated 
an upward trend which also continued after 
the momentous year 2004. the enlargement 
enabled access to the Single Market and a 
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Graph no. 1: 
Poles’ Attitudes towards 
European integration
Source: Raport – 
10 lat członkostwa 
w Unii Europejskiej, NR 52/2014, 
CBOS  Warszawa 2014
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“downpour” of cohesion money. Support 
for the EU thus reached its peak in 2008. 
then the economic crises came to Europe (to 
Poland however to a lesser extent) and like 
in many other EU member states, the society 
started to become more Eurosceptic. this 
downwards trend was broken again in 2014, 
which is correlated with the developments 
in Eastern and South-Eastern Ukraine. the 
Poles saw with their own eyes the alternative 
to their western orientation. directly after the 
implosion of the Soviet Union in 1991, the 
Polish and Ukrainian GdP were very similar. 
two and a half decades later, the Polish GdP 
is three times higher then Ukrainian, which 
is a result of the Leszek Balcerowicz’s shock 
therapy and the strategic choices undertaken 
by the post-1989 governments. Poland is 
also the only EU member state which has a 
border both with Russia and Ukraine, which 
makes it the country most exposed to the 
Ukrainian-Russian conflict. This problematic 
situation spoke to the imagination of the 
Polish people to such an extent that their 
support for the European Union skyrocketed 
and surpassed previous levels. this paper 
ends chronologically in 2015, but it needs to be 
stated that 2015 is an important time marker in 
the history of the Polish membership in the EU 
and in the post-1989 evolution in general. Both 
the presidential and parliamentary elections 
were won by the Law and Justice (Prawo i 
Sprawiedliwość) party, which appeared as a 
self-proclaimed Euro-realist, but in practice a 
strongly Euro-sceptic (by rhetoric and action) 
political actor. Consequently 2015 heralds a 
new trajectory which cannot be covered in 
this paper, but whose foundations are already 
hidden in the here described phenomenon of 
the paradoxical Euro-enthusiasm combined 
with the EURO-scepticism. Jarosław 
Kaczyński, PiS’ leader, reads the Polish 
society’s sentiments accurately and there are 
no surprises in the behaviour of his party 
(and government) towards Brussels. Perhaps 
it is even more representative than the public 
opinion polls which very often express a 
politically correct, rather than real, attitude of 
the Polish society. 
Explanations
One of the possible explanations for this 
phenomenon is the economic utility theory 
which suggests that the more the society 
gains from the European integration project, 
the more positive it is about it. In economic 
terms there are two strong arguments which 
persuade the Poles to be satisfied with their 
EU membership. One is the participation in 
the Single Market which stimulated export 
growth (as an emerging market, the Polish 
economy is very much export-dependent) and 
the second is the access to EU funds (cohesion 
and structural funds) which boosts public 
investments on an unprecedented scale. Here it 
is important to note that these two factors may 
disappear when Poland loses its competitive 
advantage (based on low labour costs3) and 
when the voivodships stop qualifying for the 
cohesion funds. due to these two assumptions, 
it is legitimate to hypothesise that the Euro-
enthusiastic attitude will decrease too.  Among 
all the positive claims on European integration 
these two seem to be the leading ones among 
the Poles. Additionally other problems are 
seemingly cumulating inside and outside 
the EU project. these are, among others, 
the Syrian civil war and resulting refugee/
migration crisis, related collective decision 
problems on the allocation of the refugees, not 
to mention the recently overcome economic 
crisis, the frozen and unresolved Russian-
3  If alternative competitive advantages are 
not developed.
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Ukrainian conflict, etc. All in all, the EU is 
no longer a promised land, a panacea for 
the inefficiencies of the Polish economy and 
politics, a prize for transformation fatigue 
(Europeanisation and conditionality thesis). 
Instead of being a solution, the EU has turned 
into a problem in the eyes of many Poles. the 
Euro-scepticism of the closest neighbours 
(like the Czech Republic) and partners (like 
Hungary or the UK) constitute an important 
contextual variable regarding this attitude. 
Consequently, when the Poles are confronted 
with the key question of their future in the 
European integration project, that is the 
participation in the Eurozone, they become 
more and more sceptical about it. the recently 
published NBP’s (Narodowy Bank Polski / 
National Bank of Poland) report concludes 
that even though Poland plans to join the final 
stage of the Monetary and Economic Union, 
it is not desirable in the current situation. It is 
the crisis (and the accompanying turbulences 
inside the Eurozone) that changed the central 
bank’s perception. A report published before 
the crisis recommended joining the Eurozone 
at the earliest opportunity – just after fulfilling 
the Maastricht convergence criteria. But Marek 
Belka, the President of NBP, said in february 
2015 during a seminar at the Bruegel think 
tank (Brussels), that the Eurozone is “(…) of 
little attractiveness for Poland at the moment” 
(Belka 2015). He also pointed to the fact that 
it was the own currency that saved Poland in 
the times of economic crisis. this statement, 
according to the scientific knowledge that we 
have, is only partially true. 
Polish society, however, is EURO-sceptical 
based on a somehow different set of ideas 
and arguments. According to the opinion 
polls study carried in 2013 by CBOS4, it is 
4  Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznych 
– raport z badań: Obawy i nadzieje związane z 
the expected high price effect that the Poles 
are the most afraid of. Even though the price 
levels in most product groups are already 
synchronised and there is not much difference 
between Poland and the Eurozone, it is this 
anticipated side-effect of introducing the 
Euro that is the most influential threat among 
the Polish citizens. Surprisingly, when 
some more detailed questions about the 
monetary integration are addressed, the Poles 
again reveal very pro-European attitudes. 
A majority (40% to 33%) claims that the 
introducing Euro in Poland will be beneficial 
for Polish companies. 68% predict that it will 
be beneficial for trans-border traffic (14% do 
not share this view). 
In general however, we can observe a negative 
tendency in Poles’ opinion on the cumulative 
effects of joining the Eurozone - 36% of Poles 
think it will be good for the economy as such 
(40% against). Just five years ago, it was 
45% for and 39% against. What is somehow 
paradoxical is the Poles’ opinion on the 
expected effects of the introduction of the 
Euro for those planning to obtain a loan. Here 
the Poles are less positive about joining the 
Eurozone – 22% think it will be good and 44% 
not good for the potential borrowers (CBOS 
2013). the last results must be a reaction to 
the “Swiss franc borrowers” problem, which 
was very painful in Central and Eastern 
Europe (especially Hungary and Poland)5. 
the interest rates of European Central Bank 
are lower than those of the Polish central bank 
and as a consequence the costs of credits are 
also lower in the Eurozone. this suggests that 
a great deal of education is needed in order to 
for people to have an informed and rational 
wprowadzeniem euro w Polsce. Komunikat z 
Badań CBOS, BS/42/2013, Warszawa, March 2013
5  Where the borrowers were exposed to the 
exchange rate fluctuation and its costs. 
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opinion before any potential referendum on 
the Eurozone entry in Poland. Right now there 
are many myths and artefacts in the public 
discourse. At the same time the Eurozone 
is growing – in January 2015 another Polish 
neighbour, Lithuania, became a new Eurozone 
member. this means that all of Poland’s main 
economic partners from the European Union 
use the Euro as their currency.
Another important point to be made in the 
public debate about the Eurozone entry is the 
alternative scenario analysis. In evaluating 
the costs and benefits of participating in the 
European monetary union, the balance of pros 
and cons of the status quo scenario should also 
be taken into account. Staying with the Polish 
Zloty does only translate into positive effects. 
During the crisis it was beneficial for Poland 
to have its own currency, but staying outside 
of the Eurozone exposes Poland to speculative 
attacks and other shocks that it would have 
been protected from inside the Euro-club. 
Coping with transformation experiences
Both Slovakia and Poland (one a Eurozone 
member, the other one not) are the leaders in 
the catch-up dynamics in the last decade as 
well as since 1989. this suggests that the Euro is 
not decisive as a factor determining economic 
growth in the CEE economies. Additionally, it 
must be noted that the historical context should 
act against Poland keeping its own currency. 
the Poles remember the experience from 1989 
and the proceeding years, when they suffered 
hyperinflation. The first transformation years 
led to a rapid devaluation of the Polish Zloty. 
The currency lost close to 600% of its value 
annually6. this constitutes one of the greatest 
6  That is quite a different experience 
compared to the East Germans, whose currency 
was exchanged 1:1 to deutsche Mark without much 
economic rationality behind.
differences in the short-term as well as long-
term consequences of the transition in Poland 
and other post-communist states. the Poles 
lost most of their savings at the beginning of 
the transition. Now they have much more to 
lose. therefore the Eurozone entry decision 
should be taken seriously and after building a 
wide consensus on the topic.  
 In conclusion it is necessary to 
stress that the gap between the strong Euro-
optimist attitudes of the Polish society and 
their EURO-sceptical views is likely to remain 
so, as it is a long-lasting phenomenon and a 
stable characteristic of the Poles’ position in 
Europe. It can be hypothesised that it will 
never close or it may close due to the shift of 
the Euro-enthusiasts’ opinions. the tendency 
of the EURO-sceptical attitudes is much more 
consistent, whereas that of the Euro-optimists 
is significantly more volatile and unbalanced. 
At the same time, the opinions of the EURO-
sceptical camp are founded on a somehow 
non-rational set of ideas. It is much more 
emotional and therefore one may expect that 
logical explanations will not be able to change 
this attitude. 
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Bulgaria in Europe – Societal Legacies, Models and Targets
A Personal Outlook
Roumen Avramov, Centre for Advanced Study Sofia
the brief notes that follow are a glimpse of the issue through my personal intellectual 
and professional experience during the last 25 
years. 
Pre-Accession I. Back to the starting 
point (1990)
Putting aside the exciting return to democra-
cy, for many economists the transformation of 
1989 was essentially a revolution of rationality. 
After years of communist economic absurdity 
and amidst the ongoing collapse of the eco-
nomic system, immediate priority was given 
to the most pressing issues of the long post-
poned stabilization policies. the focus only 
slowly shifted to the coming disruptive ad-
justment to the liberal economic order and to 
capitalism in general. 
After 15 years in academia, my first post-
1989 job was the launching of the Agency for 
Economic Coordination and development 
(AECd) - a governmental (but de facto intellec-
tually independent) analytical macroeconom-
ic observatory. the mandate we conceived 
as essential at this stage was to monitor the 
inconsistency of the adopted macroeconom-
ic policies; to highlight the conflicts between 
the market rules, the prevailing state property 
and the widespread soft budget constraints; 
to identify the incipient signs of competitive 
market behavior. 
At the very beginning the term market econo-
my was almost never used alone in the public 
debate. the notion was accompanied by an ac-
cretion of qualifications such as social or mixed: 
society was not yet prepared to swallow the 
basic principles of capitalism and people fe-
verishly searched for euphemisms replacing 
the concept. the dominant expectations were 
a vague normality, a coexistence and smooth 
competition between different “forms of prop-
erty”. Nostalgia for an idealized pre-com-
munist past spread and the ambitions were 
calibrated towards catching up with more 
prosperous neighbours like Greece. 
the analyses conducted at AECd between 
1991 and 1994 identified the core problems 
of the economy of transfers. the early phase of 
the transition was actually an exercise of un-
precedented redistribution of losses and of 
national wealth through the (often informal) 
decapitalization of the state-owned assets in 
an extremely diffuse property rights frame-
work. the process under way boiled down to 
the transformation of the tangible and intan-
gible assets (networking; information) inher-
ited from communism into private capital: a 
historically unavoidable but barely controlla-
ble shift. In the fierce political struggles that 
accompanied it, the public opinion was ob-
sessed by tormenting questions like how pri-
vate capital should be legitimized? Is it pos-
sible to accept capitalism without accepting 
the newborn capitalists? Who are the brand 
new “good” and “bad” capitalists? the peri-
od could have constituted a golden age for re-
search in new institutional economics, but the 
opportunity was actually missed. 
Europe (not only in Bulgaria) was a still distant 
and fuzzy perspective. there was neither an 
understanding of, nor interest in, the varieties 
of capitalism that existed  on the European 
continent. 
Pre-Accession II. Conceptualizing the 
1991-1996 failures 
Bulgaria did not achieve sustainable mac-
roeconomic stability until 1996. the period 
ended  with  financial turmoil including a 
major banking crisis and a short-lived hyper-
inflationary episode between December 1996 
and february 1997. this sequence of events 
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unexpectedly redirected my scholarly inter-
ests. Looking for precedents I started to realize 
that the shadow of the past never fades away; 
that intellectual legacies, inertia, path depen-
dence and continuity are critical in the econ-
omy. This led me to a detour in attempting to 
understanding the transition through history. 
Eventually history grew into my permanent 
framework of reference for the assessment of 
the current economic trends. 
the compressed message I drew from the 
pre-communist tradition was that Bulgarian 
economic culture has no memories of a liber-
al order and that the legacy of the European 
liberal and globalized 19th century is missing 
or strongly distorted. the “second Bulgari-
an capitalism” had nowhere to return to, no 
memories or genetic codes to revive. the im-
print of the state and collectivistic values be-
fore communism could be felt in numerous 
areas: the strong influence of cooperativism; 
the repetitive patterns of crisis resolutions; the 
reluctance to reform; the dislike of capitalism 
and the pervasive search for “third ways”; 
the impact of the war economy which shaped 
many aspects of the forthcoming communism; 
the effects of the autocratic regime and the 
no-parties system in place since 1934… I was 
mostly interested in the turning points at both 
extremes (the raise and the fall) of commu-
nism which surprisingly revealed more conti-
nuities than disruptions. I found out that, par-
adoxically, the public was intellectually more 
equipped to accept the centralized planned 
economy in the mid-1940s (in a sense society 
was pregnant/infected with communism) than 
to face capitalism in the early 1990s. 
In this reading of history Europe acquired a 
definitely greater significance for Bulgaria. 
the perception of Europe emerged as the last-
ing metaphor of modernity, the epitome of a 
superior partner and competitor; a strong at-
tractor in a hopeless process of catching up; 
the image of everything Bulgaria is not; the 
idealized immaculate province where order 
reigns, rules are strictly observed and prosper-
ity accessible to all.
Pre-Accession III.  Preparing for acces-
sion
the negotiations for EU accession began in 
1999. As a member of the Board of Gover-
nors of the Bulgarian National Bank at that 
moment I was involved in defining a credible 
and reasonable path from the Currency Board 
Arrangement (CBA) introduced in 1997 to the 
Eurozone.  
the CBA is a somewhat exotic monetary sys-
tem (adopted in the 1990s by Bulgaria, the 
Baltic countries, Argentina and Hong Kong) 
which is based on a fixed exchange rate and 
rules out refinancing of the commercial banks 
and direct funding of the budget by the central 
bank. Strictly speaking it is a technical device 
providing financial and thus macroeconom-
ic stability. In a broader sense the CBA was 
conceived as a cultural breach that was instru-
mental in eliminating the channels of corrup-
tion linking the central bank, the commercial 
banks and the government. 
the design of the CBA embedded two strate-
gic choices related to Bulgaria’s European per-
spective. the country sent a strong signal by 
ignoring the USd (the then prevailing mone-
tary substitute) and selecting the dEM (to be 
automatically replaced by the euro) as anchor 
currency. Moreover, the CBA had a credible 
exit (not the case for Argentina where the 
CBA collapsed in 2001) with the mandatory 
adoption of the euro. Convincing the ECB that 
floating the Bulgarian Lev before joining the 
Eurozone (as stipulated by the standard pro-
cedures) would be a risky exercise was not an 
easy task. It was finally agreed, however, that 
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Bulgaria and the other CBA countries deemed 
to join the EU will keep their monetary system 
untouched until adopting the single currency. 
during the lengthy accession process Europe 
became a tangible bureaucratic counterpart. 
A large-scale legal harmonization and adop-
tion of the acquis communautaire was carried 
out, regular progress reports were produced, 
and the country was officially recognized as 
a functioning market economy. Simultane-
ously, the EU emerged as a strong economic 
pole of attraction in the extremely favorable 
global context of 2002-2008 when Bulgaria 
benefited from a huge inflow of FDI reaching 
30% of GDP in 2008. The structure of the for-
eign investments and the absorption capacity 
of the economy, however, produced relative-
ly modest results. during that period annual 
economic growth exceeded 6% only twice and 
real estate bubbles inflated as elsewhere. 
Entering Europe I. Shifting the economic 
conditionality paradigm
External economic conditionality is an essen-
tial factor shaping peripheral societies. this 
was confirmed during the post-communist 
transition when the role of ideas was largely 
overestimated: the transition was not so much 
a “spontaneous” competition of strategies; it 
was very marginally an intellectual history. 
A great deal of the changes has been induced 
through superficial technocratic procedures. 
After 1989 the major shift in this area was the 
move from the IMf-type to the EU-type con-
ditionality. In the 1990s the IMf followed the 
traditional conditionality design and its uni-
versalistic meta-language. In broad lines, it 
restored the conditionality setting familiar to 
pre-communist Bulgaria and implemented 
by foreign bondholders (early 20th century), 
the Inter-Allied Commission or the League of 
Nations (during the interwar period). EU ac-
cession/membership, in turn, implied a much 
deeper, far-reaching and ambitious project 
touching values and the structure of the over-
all society. 
the basic economic assumption of the EU 
model is that membership initiates through 
nominal convergence a lengthy rapproche-
ment to the average welfare indicators of the 
Union. from 2007 to 2014 Bulgaria’s GdP/cap-
ita (in PPP) has, indeed, progressed from 29 
% to 47% of the average EU level. The much 
stronger implicit idea of the European acquis 
is that accession would instigate a gradual in-
filtration of the “strong culture” into the new 
entrants’ economic culture. A smooth linear 
motion is postulated which implies the exis-
tence of a clear-cut “hierarchy” of societies, a 
well-defined vector of motion and the possi-
bility of outstripping along this vector. 
Linear advance, however, is by no means war-
ranted. there is no steady and irreversible 
path to ideal types. A complicated interplay 
of economic cultures is at work with differ-
ent blends and/or equilibrium points between 
their “weak” and the “strong” components. 
for Bulgaria, in particular, society is plagued 
by networking, conflicts of interest, and bar-
ters of influence. Business and politics are not 
effectively fenced off from one another. Truly 
competitive markets remain scarce due to their 
small size, chronic capital shortage, particular 
geopolitical status, or historical traumas. 
thus, instead of linearity we observe occasion-
al reversals, a stop/go rhythm and continuous 
monitoring. for the economy and economic 
institutions (as for human beings) timing is 
essential. A latter replica is not identical to 
the original. Copying cannot replace the ab-
sence of one’s own history. Social experience 
is accumulated, not simply transferred. It is 
impossible to live someone else’s past. When, 
for example, the economic texture is the con-
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sequence of mostly private efforts, while else-
where (in a latecomer’s society) a similar struc-
ture is shaped by government intervention, 
the two realms are not alike. 
Entering Europe II
Europe’s basic ambiguity is the fundamen-
tal dichotomy of Western economic culture 
which combines, in an often incoherent way, 
two conflicting principles. On the one side, 
there is the statist, dirigiste, regulationist and 
interventionist philosophy embedded in the 
EU bureaucratic functions and activities. On 
the other side there are the distinctly liber-
al and free-market values rooted in the most 
far-reaching projects such as the free move-
ment of people, the single market and the 
euro. Newcomers are free to choose among 
those options according to their local idiosyn-
crasies. Whatever their preference, they are 
sure to find somewhere in Europe a mirror im-
age of the selected option. 
Bulgaria’s preferences are entirely in line with 
its historical traditions. the pragmatic/oppor-
tunistic choices overshadow other consider-
ations. Without any doubt, free movement is 
a highly prized new right. But beyond it the 
public expects from Europe money, not values; 
state, not market. those expectations foster 
a lenient economic culture, not the entrepre-
neurial spirit of the heroic Weberian or Shum-
peterian capitalist. the generalized anticipa-
tions for “easy money” distributed top down 
teach people to deal with (and to outsmart) the 
bureaucracy; not to play the markets.  
Eurofunds represent a mere 2% of GDP but 
they attract disproportionate public attention. 
These flows are a valuable substitute for the 
limited domestic government financing for 
public infrastructure but they also generate 
unhealthy speculations. Since the accession 
the only game in town is how to capture these 
funds which cultivates a corrupting environ-
ment: their inherent distributive logic fuels 
both the ever vivid corruption practices and 
paranoiac conspiracy insights. As a whole, 
they nurture low trust in a society where, 
quite often, the manipulated anti-corruption 
speech is even nastier than corruption. 
Bulgaria’s EU membership also has a number 
of identity side effects, among them the de-
pressing outcome of visualization. Backward-
ness becomes more transparent to the extent 
that it is not the same to be a relatively poor 
country outside and the poorest one inside 
an affluent community. No radical preposi-
tioning in the secular ranking of the Europe-
an countries’ economic/social development is 
at sight and the old wealth divides are trans-
posed inside the EU. An exceptionalist mood 
prevails and, as it is customary in the region, 
the other part of the continent is still perceived 
as an alien space, the we/they opposition re-
mains, and the majority of the Bulgarians con-
sider themselves “half-Europeans”. It is hence 
no wonder that the hybridity of economic cul-
ture becomes a focal point of scholarly inter-
est. 
Lessons from the crisis. Moving Europe I 
the turning point of the Great Recession has 
had important repercussions. It revealed con-
cealed/forgotten/ignored faces of Europe, de-
stabilized and redesigned rules and goals, and 
generated widespread disenchantment. 
the crisis highlighted unstable patterns of behav-
ior where ambiguous practices in the banking 
sector or in public governance have been com-
mon. A key lesson from economic history was 
confirmed: the highly demanding constraints 
of the market are considered as uncomfortable 
and universally disliked by firms, states and 
households. the overriding instinct is not to 
follow, but to distort competition and conven-
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tions by drifting to monopolism and to collu-
sion with political power. Rules are avoided 
and circumvented or – at least – no one refrains 
from avoiding them when such an opportuni-
ty appears. Economic history could be read as 
an often successful series of attempts to evade 
the “market discomfort”. Communism is the 
apex in this respect. 
the recent collapse showed to a generation, 
pampered by a long series of mild recessions 
and tempted by oblivion, that capitalist dy-
namic is inherently (sometimes violently) cy-
clical. the well-known but periodically forgot-
ten fact is that even in the “mature” economies 
risks cannot be fully mastered. Not only entre-
preneurs but also consumers and the public at 
large are attracted by risk. They like/tolerate 
being defrauded because this is accompanied 
by the fascinating veil of short-term gains. Cri-
ses (more so the major of them) are the out-
comes of risky conduct beyond reason which 
despite the regulations is intrinsic to the sys-
tem, not the exception. the 2008 breakdown 
showed how it had been possible to transfer 
losses of unsuspected magnitude, to make 
them opaque, to increase leverage by an un-
precedented factor, and to create a shadow 
bank system. All this wrapped in a persuasive 
doctrine, a permissive intellectual ambiance 
and a loose regulatory framework. 
the Great Recession revealed moving policies 
and targets. In the tackling of the crisis the EU 
was not the once acclaimed rocky rule-based 
system. Non-compliances with regulations 
(for instance budget deficits) were tolerated; 
supervision has been weak, partial and dom-
inated by “bank nationalism”. the Eurozone 
rules are being changed on board.1 Restric-
1  A telling specific case in point is Bulgaria’s 
postponed accession into the Eurozone. Although by 
2007-2008 the country was fulfilling the Maastricht 
criteria and was technically eligible to join ERM II, 
tions to free movement of labor are discussed 
and implemented. Policies rightly considered 
as vicious in the periphery (massive bail-outs 
of irresponsible debtors or imprudent credi-
tors) are applied in the core countries. In this 
context of moving, disappearing or fragment-
ed objectives, catching up becomes nearly 
impossible. Why copy models that reproduce 
dubious behavioural patterns the copiers are 
held responsible for? 
While politically (to a certain extent also eco-
nomically) understandable, the response to 
the crisis through a rush towards stricter regu-
lations is misleading. In the long run markets 
cannot be outsmarted. they will invent new 
devices to transgress the established controls; 
the larger the weight of government, the stron-
ger the incentives to socialize losses. 
Lessons from the crisis. Moving Europe II
the after-2008 realm is a world of moving 
ideas. Even if for the bulk of my generation/
milieu of economists the reasonable order is 
that of a liberal economy, the crisis obviously 
calls for a certain degree of humility. We have 
to acknowledge that the liberal point of view 
does not necessary reflect the “common inter-
est”; that in a democratic society the liberal 
economic values are not shared by the ma-
jority and cannot be systematically imposed 
through elections. they are not (as we thought 
in the early 1990s) a goal with predetermined 
success. A lesson to be (re)learnt from the re-
cent turbulences is that we have to get accus-
tomed to the cyclical movements of the con-
ceptual pendulum. 
non-economic considerations prevented this step. 
this possibility has been rejected tacitly as it was 
deemed impossible for a country with obvious 
shortcomings in the judiciary, a poor corruption 
record and a monitoring mechanism for rule of law 
compliance to enter the Eurozone.
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Nowadays the neoclassical economics’ para-
digm is under siege. Cavernous anti-capitalist 
hate and fierce anti-liberal attitudes emerged 
from their more or less latent retreats and flood 
the public arena. The financial profession (ac-
tivity) is demonized, thus returning the public 
imagery back to the 18 century’s opposition 
between “productive/unproductive” labour 
and to the Marxian antagonism between “fic-
titious/material” capitals. The attractiveness of 
anti-mainstream in the current circumstanc-
es is quite natural. While during the 1990s in 
Eastern Europe liberalism was iconoclastic, 
many of its versions eventually evolved into 
doctrinarian libertarian rhetoric, apologetic, 
conformism and lack of critical thinking. from 
another side, the aversion to the boring Euro-
pean discourse and political correctness is ir-
resistible. 
But the crisis certainly does not seal the death 
of liberal attitudes. In economics no alternative 
consensual paradigm is in sight. the recent in-
tellectual novelties are mostly trivial remakes 
of Keynesianism. The Thomas Piketty trend, 
for instance, might seem to be a respectable 
revival of Marxism or of the anti-capitalist cri-
tiques of the 1960s, but it ultimately rests upon 
shaky empirical grounds which will be cer-
tainly falsified (in Popper’s terms) in the near 
future. the deep theoretical fundamentals of 
neoclassicism stand still firmly. As concerns 
the practical policies that accompanied the 
crisis, the wave of nationalisation was not an 
ideologically inspired turn, but essentially an 
urgent, unorthodox and reversible monetary 
tool. 
finally, this crisis moves borders and redesigns 
fault lines across Europe. It imposed the im-
ages of the South European specie (corruption; 
institutional immaturity; clientelism) and con-
firmed the North-South divide. Simultaneous-
ly, the torment of the euro reintroduced the 
hardest 19th century conditionality tools (rem-
iniscent of the 1897 Debt Committee in Greece 
or the earlier precedent with the Ottoman Em-
pire and Egypt), and enhanced the concentric 
circles in a de facto two-layer Europe. the 
events also had some healthy effects insofar as 
the strong commitment of Europe to the single 
currency fostered unavoidable (albeit still tim-
id) federalist elements which are badly need-
ed for the consistency of the overall monetary 
construct. 
In purely macroeconomic aspects Bulgaria 
ranged closer to Northern Europe’s financial 
orthodoxy without gaining, however, many 
image benefits from this respectable track re-
cord. Concerning economic culture, the Greek 
crisis confirmed the affinity of the two coun-
tries’ models. Leaving aside parallels from a 
more distant past, common features are clear-
ly recognizable in the interwar period. during 
post-war those states’ economic development 
were mirror images on the two sides of the 
Iron Curtain: in many respects Greece was a 
tangible realization of a hypothetical, would-
be, non-communist Bulgaria. finally, after 
communism they provided comparable ex-
amples of failed economic models outside and 
inside the EU. 
Concluding remarks
In Bulgaria, as elsewhere in Eastern Europe, 
the fall of communism was lived as a bold 
break and a revolution. A quarter of century 
later, the transition is a story about continuities 
and longue durée social and intellectual legacies 
that continue to shape attitudes and values; a 
narrative about the difficulties encountered by 
the “new” society to overcome personal, intel-
lectual and economic sequels of the “old” one. 
It is an exercise that is made all the more com-
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plex by the fact that the reference goal Europe 
has itself experienced dramatic changes. 
there was actually no single transition but a 
sequence of them. there is no teleology, no 
linear movement and unmovable goals but a 
fluctuating, uncertain path, like in the verses 
of Antonio Machado: 
Caminante no hay camino, se hace camino al 
andar… /traveler, there is no path. the path is 
made by walking…/
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